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I. INTRODUCTION
Washington courts have misapplied federal case law under Fifth
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution in three respects. First, while
Washington appellate courts have purported to apply the tests for finding
a regulatory taking under federal law, the Washington courts’ articulation
of those tests substantially departs from federal jurisprudence and
ultimately results in less protection for property rights than accorded by
federal law. Second, state court decisions have departed from federal
case law by extending the Nollan1 and Dolan2 nexus and proportionality
tests beyond the narrow realm of land use permit conditioning and by
using those tests as restraints on land use regulation in general. And
third, our state courts have inappropriately used the Nollan and Dolan
tests as supplying a constitutional basis for the court’s construction of the
statutory prohibition against taxes, fees and charges on the development
under Chapter 82.02 RCW.
Our courts can correct the misapplication of federal takings law in
three ways: (1) by adopting the federal takings tests and abandoning the
state’s hybrid test; (2) by narrowing the application of the Nollan and
Dolan holdings to circumstances raising the potential for unconstitutional
conditions, as recently clarified by the court in Koontz v. St Johns River
Water Management District;3 and (3) by uncoupling Chapter 82.02 from
Fifth Amendment Takings Doctrine.
This paper begins with an analysis of differences between federal
and state tests under the Fifth Amendment and argues for abandonment
of the state’s hybrid test, as have others. It then discusses the holdings of
Nollan, Dolan, and Koontz in the context of the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine and describes how our state courts’ application of the
Nollan and Dolan tests beyond the realm of unconstitutional conditions
lacks support in federal case law and does not offer a constitutional
dimension to RCW Chapter 82.02. And finally, apart from the limitations
under Chapter 82.02, the paper identifies those monetary exactions and
permit conditioning that would be subject to the nexus and
proportionality tests under Nollan, Dolan, and Koontz, and those that
would not.

1. Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
2. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
3. Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S.Ct. 2586, 186 L. Ed. 2d 697 (2013).
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II.
THE STATE’S TEST FOR REGULATORY TAKINGS
DEPARTS FROM AND ULTIMATELY WEAKENS FEDERAL
STANDARDS FOR REGULATORY TAKINGS.
In 1987, the Washington Supreme Court in Orion Corp. v. State,4
proceeded at great length to address differences between Washington and
federal case law on regulatory takings, but in the end resolved to follow
the federal analysis.5 Had the court heeded its resolution, the existing
discrepancies between federal and state analyses would not likely have
arisen. But as with many resolutions, the initial commitment was shortlived. Subsequent state takings decisions have transformed an effort to
follow federal analysis into a mix of takings and substantive due process
law that is confusing, difficult to apply, and erects substantial hurdles to
a property owner attempting to prove up a takings claim.
Claims of regulatory takings arise under the Takings Clause of the
Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, which in part provides:
“[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation.” A classic taking involves the transfer of property to the
state or another public entity by eminent domain.6 But when the
government uses its police power to accomplish the same thing, a taking
may also result.7 The doctrine of regulatory takings has evolved “to
identify regulatory actions that are functionally equivalent to the classic
taking in which government directly appropriates private property. . . .”8
The development of Washington’s regulatory takings jurisprudence
can be traced through a number of decisions: Orion Corp. v. State,
Presbytery of Seattle v. King Cnty.,9 and Guimont v. Clarke,10 which each
significantly changed the tests for regulatory takings. As noted above,
Orion attempted to reconcile state and federal analyses. Presbytery
developed a framework for addressing takings and substantive due
process claims.11 And Guimont modified the state takings analysis to
account for the holding in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council12
that a regulation denying all economically beneficial use resulted in a per
se taking. Subsequent to Guimont, the state Supreme Court has either
4. Orion Corp. v. State, 109 Wash. 2d 621, 747 P.2d 1062 (1987).
5. Id. at 657-58.
6. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 560 U.S. 702 (2010).
7. Id.
8. City of Des Moines v. Gray Businesses, LLC, 130 Wash. App. 600, 619, 124 P.3d 324, 334
(2005) (citing Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 539 (2005)).
9. Presbytery of Seattle v. King Cnty, 114 Wash. 2d 320, 787 P.2d 907 (1990).
10. Guimont v. Clarke, 121 Wash. 2d 586, 854 P.2d 1 (1993).
11. Presbytery, 114 Wash. 2d at 329.
12. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1016 (1992).
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followed Guimont, as in Margola Associates v. City of Seattle,13 or
addressed takings claims without applying the Guimont analysis, as in
Brutsche v. City of Kent.14 But the state takings analysis largely remains
unchanged since the holding in Guimont. Because the evolution of the
Washington’s regulatory takings analysis has been extensively addressed
by others,15 this article focuses instead on the inconsistencies between the
state and federal analyses of regulatory takings.
Federal takings law has undergone its own evolution, developed
through such cases as: Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City;16
Agins v. City of Tiburon;17 Nollan, Dolan, Lucas; Monterey v. Del
Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd.;18 Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v.
Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency;19 Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc.;20 and
most recently, Koontz v. St Johns River Water Mgmt. District. Of these
cases, this article discusses in detail the holdings in Nollan, Dolan,
Lingle and Koontz and leaves to others the larger topic of the evolution
of federal takings law.
Drawing upon what has been analyzed before,21 this part
summarizes the principal discrepancies between state and federal tests
for regulatory takings and shows why the state test ultimately provides
less protection of private property rights than the federal test. Since it
provides context for Washington’s rule, the federal analysis is discussed
first, followed by a discussion of how the Washington takings analysis
conflicts with the very federal law it purports to implement. The

13. Margola Assoc. v. City of Seattle, 121 Wash. 2d 625, 647, 854 P.2d 23 (1993).
14. Brutsche v. City of Kent, 164 Wash. 2d 664, 680-84, 193 P.3d 110 (2008) (applied the
federal test to federal takings claims).
15. See earlier articles of Richard L. Settle, Regulatory Taking Doctrine in Washington: Now
You See It, Now You Don’t, 12 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 339, 368-69 (1989), JEFFREY M. EUSTIS,
Between Scylla and Charybdis: Growth Management Act Implementation That Avoids Takings and
Substantive Due Process Limitations, 16 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 1181, 1191-92 (1993). This
article draws upon analysis within more recent, post-Lingle, articles by Roger Wynne, The Path Out
of Washington’s Takings Quagmire: The Case for Adopting the Federal Takings Analysis,
(“Wynne”) 86 WASH. L. REV. 125 (2011) and P. Dayton and L. Clark, Lingle Lingering: Seven
Years after the United States Supreme Court’s Lingle v. Chevron USA, Inc., Washington Courts
Have Not Reformed the State’s Regulatory Takings Test, 39 ENVTL. & LAND USE LAW (WSBA,
May 2012) in contending that Washington’s taking analysis is out of step with that applied by the
US Supreme Court.
16. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
17. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
18. City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, 526 U.S. 687, 704 (1999).
19. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 334
(2002).
20. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 542 (2005).
21. See Wynne, supra note 15.
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subsequent section discusses the disparate treatment of the holdings in
Nollan and Dolan and the recent decision in Koontz.
The U.S. Supreme Court’s holding in Lingle v. Chevron recognizes
three types of regulatory takings: 1) appropriation of land through
physical occupation;22 2) the deprivation of all economically viable use
(unless such deprivation of use results from the application of
background principles of nuisance and property law);23 and 3) those that
fail the Penn Central three-part test.24 A regulatory action failing either
of the first two tests (physical invasion or denial of all use) results in a
per se or categorical taking without regard to considerations of
countervailing governmental interests.25 An action passing the
categorical tests but nonetheless affecting the use or value of property
would be reviewed for its impact upon the specific parcel in question
through the ad hoc or “as applied” factors adopted by the Penn Central
court.26 The extent of a regulation’s impact is based upon consideration
of the parcel as a whole and not on a regulation’s impact upon discreet
incidents of ownership or particular portions of the property.27 The
federal takings test is illustrated in the diagram set forth at Appendix A
to this paper.
Lingle significantly altered federal regulatory takings law by
abandoning a test established 25 years earlier in Agins v. City of Tiburon
that “[t]he application of a general zoning law to particular property
effects a taking if the ordinance does not substantially advance legitimate
22. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982). As elaborated upon
below, in the subsequent decisions of Nollan and Dolan the court has upheld permit conditions
requiring the dedication of private property for the public use of private property as long as such an
exaction demonstrates an “essential nexus,” Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987), to
a legitimate state interest and is “roughly proportional,” Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374
(1994), to the impact of the permitted action. As also discussed below, the recent decision in Koontz
holds that monetary exactions imposed through land use permitting are subject to the Nollan and
Dolan limitations, Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S.Ct. 2586, 186 L. Ed. 2d 697
(2013).
23. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1016 (1992).
24. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) (establishing a test
involving consideration of three factors: 1) economic impact of the challenged regulation on the
property owner); 2) the regulation’s interference with investment-backed expectations; and 3) the
character of the governmental action).
25. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 542.
26. Id.(characterizing the three part test as involving “ad hoc, factual inquiries” into the impact
of the regulation upon the property at issue).
27. Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65-66 (1979) (finding the deprivation of the right to transfer
property, eagle feathers regulated under the Migratory Bird Act, the court held that “the denial of
one traditional property right does not always amount to a taking. At least where an owner possesses
a full ‘bundle’ of property rights, the destruction of one ‘strand’ of the bundle is not a taking,
because the aggregate must be viewed in its entirety.”(citation omitted)).
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state interests . . . or denies an owner economically viable use of his
land[.]”28 The Lingle court corrected course and held that the
“‘substantially advances’ formula is not a valid takings test, and . . . it
has no proper place in our takings jurisprudence.”29 But as seen below,
the “substantially advances” test features prominently in Washington’s
takings analysis, both before and after the ruling in Lingle.
As noted above, the Washington Supreme Court in Orion addressed
differences between federal and state approaches to regulatory takings.
The court’s next application of its analysis came in Presbytery of Seattle
v. King County, in which the court considered Orion to have
“coordinated”30 the state and federal tests for regulatory takings. The
conclusion that the state and federal analyses of regulatory takings
provided the same right of protection also continued through subsequent
decisions in Sintra, Inc. v. City of Seattle;31 Robinson v. City of Seattle;32
Guimont v. Clark;33and Margola Associates v. City of Seattle.34
The Washington state takings analysis includes the three parts of the
federal test but interjects three more tests of its own. The Washington
analysis is illustrated in Appendix B to this paper. The state test begins
with a threshold inquiry that applies the two per se tests of the federal
analysis—whether the regulation results in a physical invasion of
property and whether the regulation denies the property owner “all
economically viable use.”35 And the state test ends with the third part to
the federal analysis, consideration of the Penn Central factors. But
before reaching the Penn Central test, the state analysis interjects three
additional inquiries, which ultimately result in a lower protection of
property rights.36
As with the federal test, an affirmative answer to either of the first
two inquiries (physical invasion or deprivation of all use) results in a
taking. But as part of its initial threshold inquiry, the state broadens parts
28. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980) (emphasis added) (citing to a due
process case, Nectow v. Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 188 (1928), for the first part of the Agins test and
to Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. 104, 138, for the second part of the Agins test).
29. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 548.
30. Presbytery of Seattle v. King Cnty, 114 Wash. 2d 320, 328, 787 P.2d 907 (1990).
31. Sintra Inc. v. City of Seattle, 119 Wash. 2d 1, 14, 829 P.2d 765 (1992).
32. Robinson v. City of Seattle, 119 Wash. 2d 34, 49-54, 830 P.2d 318 (1992).
33. See Guimont v. Clarke, 121 Wash. 2d 586, 854 P.2d 1 (1993).
34. Margola Assoc. v. City of Seattle, 121 Wash. 2d 625, 646-649, 854 P.2d 23 (1993).
35. Guimont, 121 Wash. 2d at 597, 600.
36. Roger Wynne, The Path Out of Washington’s Takings Quagmire: The Case for Adopting
the Federal Takings Analysis, 86 WASH. L. REV. 125, 134-146 (2011) (describing in greater detail
the inconsistencies created by Washington’s interjection of three additional elements into the federal
takings analysis).
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1 and 2 of the federal test by asking more generally whether the
regulation would destroy a “fundamental attribute” of property
ownership, such as the right to possess, exclude others, or dispose of the
property.37 Under the state’s first threshold test, a finding of physical
invasion or deprivation of use would result in a per se taking, subject of
course to the right of the government to show that deprivation of use
results from application of background principles of nuisance and
property law.38 Although under Guimont a regulation’s interference with
some other “fundamental attribute” of property (other than the rights to
exclude and to make beneficial use) would be considered within the first
threshold inquiry, the court has stated that such interference would not
result in an automatic, or per se, taking, therefore, requiring further
analysis under the state’s remaining tests for regulatory takings.39
If the regulation survives the first threshold inquiry (i.e., no physical
invasion, no deprivation of all economic use), the state analysis moves to
a second threshold inquiry and asks whether the regulation “seeks less to
prevent harm than to impose on those regulated a requirement of
providing an affirmative public benefit.”40 If the regulation is shown
more to prevent harm than to provide a public benefit (and it does not
cause a physical invasion or loss of all use), no taking results and the
court does not proceed to the third part of the federal test, application of
the Penn Central factors,41 thus insulating the measure from scrutiny of
an “as applied” taking and depriving property owners of the opportunity
to prove up the third part of the federal takings test. Thus, the second
threshold inquiry into considerations of prevention of harm and exaction
of public benefits provides a level of insulation of governmental action
from claims of regulatory takings.
However, if the regulation does not survive the second threshold
test (because it serves more to provide a public benefit than to prevent
harm), or if it interferes with some other fundamental attribute of
37. Guimont, 121 Wash. 2d at 594-95; Margola, 121 Wash. 2d at 643-45.
38. Guimont, 121 Wash. 2d at 602-03 (“If the landowner proves a “total taking”or “physical
invasion” has occurred, and if the State fails to rebut that claim, the owner is entitled to . . . just
compensation without case-specific inquiry into the legitimacy of the public interest supporting the
regulation.”).
39. Id.at 603 n.6 (“Not every infringement on a fundamental attribute of property ownership
necessarily constitutes a ‘taking.’”). The court in Guimont v. City of Seattle (Guimont II), 77 Wash.
App. 74, 85 n.6, 896 P.2d 70 (1995), a case challenging as a taking the prohibition of RV trailers in
mobile home parks, found the Supreme Court’s analysis in the prior Guimont decision unclear as to
“where the analysis goes if a regulation does not effect a ‘total taking’ or ‘physical invasion’ but
does implicate a fundamental attribute of property ownership.”
40. Guimont, 121 Wash. 2d at 603.
41. Id.
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property (apart the right to exclude and to make beneficial use) under the
first threshold test, the state analysis interjects a third test into the federal
analysis by asking whether the regulation advances legitimate state
interests.42 If not, a taking results.43 But if the regulation serves to
advance legitimate state interests, then the court proceeds with
application of the three Penn Central factors.44 Thus, the third inquiry
provides another level of insulation for governmental actions from
challenges as regulatory takings.
The significant differences between the federal and state tests for
regulatory takings make it very difficult to concur with the Washington
court’s belief that the “comprehensive formula” in Presbytery
“coordinated” federal and state takings law. In the three respects outlined
above the Washington test departs from the federal test and ultimately
weakens the Fifth Amendment’s protection of property rights. But of
course in applying the federal constitution, which the Washington
takings cases purport to do, the state court may not substitute its analysis
for that of the U.S. Supreme Court.45 While the state may provide
broader protection under the federal constitution, it may not provide for a
weaker level of protection.46
As described above, the Washington takings analysis inserts three
additional inquiries into the federal test, by asking whether the
challenged measure: 1) interferes with a fundamental attribute of
property; 2) seeks less to prevent harm than to provide an affirmative
public benefit; or 3) substantially advances a legitimate state interest.
The first inquiry potentially expands the federal categories of per se
takings beyond physical invasions and deprivation of all use. But the
second and third inquiries interject tests that have been abandoned by the
U.S. Supreme Court decisions and that ultimately weaken Fifth
Amendment protections.
The first of these three additional inquiries alters the federal
analysis by potentially expanding the federal test for per se takings
(physical invasion or denial of all use) to more broadly include the
destruction of any fundamental attribute of property, described as
including the right to possess, to exclude others, and to dispose of

42. Presbytery of Seattle v. King Cnty, 114 Wash. 2d 320, 328,333, 787 P.2d 907 (1990);
Guimont, 121 Wash. 2d at 604.
43. Margola Assoc. v. City of Seattle, 121 Wash. 2d 625, 645, 854 P.2d 23 (1993).
44. Id. at 645-46.
45. N.C. v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 375-76 (1979); B.F.Goodrich Co. v. State, 38 Wash. 2d 663,
676, 231 P. 2d 325 (1951).
46. State v. Gunwall, 106 Wash. 2d 54, 59, 720 P. 2d 808 (1986).
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property.47 As noted earlier, federal law considers a regulation’s impact
on the property as a whole, not simply the portion or attribute affected,
even with respect to such attributes as the right to transfer.48 If the first
threshold inquiry is used to extend per se takings beyond physical
invasions and denial of use, it has not been subject to an analysis under
State v. Gunwall. An analysis under Gunwall is necessary for the state to
accord greater protection under federal constitutional rights than
provided for under federal law.49
The second of the state’s additional inquiries, whether measures
seek more to prevent harm than provide public benefit, serves to insulate
governmental action from takings challenges, was rejected by Lucas, 50
and plays no part in Lingle’s formulation of takings analysis.
And the state’s third additional inquiry, whether the measure
advances legitimate state interests, interjects a substantive due process
test which Lingle specifically rejected.51
In sum, the state’s additional tests for regulatory takings deprive
property owners of full protection under the Fifth Amendment and are
not legally defensible. Nonetheless, state appellate courts continue to
apply those tests even after the decision in Lingle.52 As with other
consistencies, resolution lies in correcting course.53 Quite simply, the
47. Guimont v. Clarke, 121 Wash. 2d 586, 608, 854 P.2d 1 (1993).
48. See Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65-66 (1979)
49. The court in Manufactured Housing Communities of Washington, 142 Wash. 2d 347, 35661, 13 P.3d 183 (2000), applied the Gunwall analysis to the provision within Article I, section 16
that “[p]rivate property shall not be taken for private use [except in certain listed circumstances]”
and concluded that the state’s prohibition against taking property for private use offered broader
protection than the Fifth Amendment. However, the Washington courts have not conducted a
Gunwall review of the three unique parts to Washington’s analysis of takings under the Fifth
Amendment. Moreover, Presbytery and Guimont do not give full first threshold treatment to the
interference with fundamental attributes of property other than invasions and deprivation of all use,
since the court does not consider such interferences to automatically amount to per se takings. See
Presbytery of Seattle v. King Cnty, 114 Wash. 2d 320, 334 n.21, 787 P.2d 907 (1990); Guimont at
603 n.6.
50. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1026 (1992) (characterizing the
harm/benefit distinction as “difficult, if not impossible, to discern on an objective, value-free
bases”).
51. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 548 (2005).
52. In City of Des Moines v. Gray Businesses, LLC, 130 Wash. App. 600, 331, 124 P.3d 324
(2005), the court denied a regulatory takings challenge of a mobile home park restriction under
Washington takings test, but noted at footnote 33 that the holding in Lingle had removed the
“substantially advances” test from federal takings law. In Thun v. City of Bonney Lake, 164 Wash.
App. 755, 760 fn. 4, 265 P.3d 207 (2011), the court acknowledged the Lingle decision, but applied
the Washington test in denying a takings challenge to the rezoning of property from commercial to
residential use.
53. See In re Stranger Creek & Tributaries in Stevens Cnty., 77 Wash. 2d 649, 653, 466 P.2d
508 (1970) (recognizing that the court may abandon an established rule of law upon a “clear
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state could conform its analysis of Fifth Amendment with federal law by
adopting the tests for regulatory takings under Lingle. In the recent
appeal in Lemire v The Pollution Control Hearings Board, et al.,54
amicus briefs argued for the adoption of the federal tests, but the court
chose not to revisit its takings analysis on grounds that the facts of the
case failed to support claims of a taking.
Inconsistencies between state and federal application of takings law
are not limited to the federal three-part test for takings, but also arise in
application of the first part of the federal test, which protects private
property from physical invasions. These inconsistencies are addressed in
the next section of this paper.
III.
A.

THE STATE MISAPPLIES THE NOLLAN AND DOLAN
LIMITATIONS.
Nollan and Dolan apply within the narrow doctrine of unconstitutional conditions.

The Nollan decision often is advanced for the proposition that to
conform to limitations under the Fifth Amendment of the US
Constitution a regulation on the use of land must demonstrate an
“essential nexus” to the perceived harm of the proposed development.
The decision in Dolan frequently is offered for the proposition that the
extent of land use regulation must be “roughly proportional” to the
impacts of anticipated development. In actuality, neither holding applies
universally to all forms of regulation. As clarified by the 2005 decision
in Lingle and the 2013 decision in Koontz, the Nollan and Dolan
holdings are limited to circumstances involving the exaction of
conditions in the review of land use permits.
In Nollan, the claimants acquired a California oceanfront lot located
between two parks. An eight-foot-high seawall divided the lot into two
portions: an upland area extending from a seawall back to a road, and a
beach area extending from the seawall to the Pacific Ocean. The Nollans
desired to replace a small cottage with a modern three-bedroom house.
showing” that the rule is “incorrect and harmful.”); see also Lingle, 544 U.S. at 548 (abandoning 25
years of application of the “substantially advances” test within takings analysis, the court
“correct[ed] course”).
54 Lemire v. Dep’t of Ecology, 178 Wash. 2d 227, 242, 309 P.3d 395 (2013). A number of
organizations submitted an amicus brief urging the court to abandon the state’s takings analysis and
adopt the federal test in its place. Although, the author of this paper is among the co-signers to that
brief, credit is owed to its principal author, Roger Wynne, writing on behalf of the Washington State
Association of Municipal Attorneys.
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When they sought necessary permits, the California Coastal Commission
required that they dedicate an easement for public use across the beach
portion of their lot. According to the Commission, the requested
easement served to make it easier for the public to travel between the two
parks. The Nollans challenged the easement requirement through the
state court system and ultimately to the United States Supreme Court.
In striking down the easement condition the court reasoned as
follows: in the absence of the permit, the Commission could not lawfully
exact an easement without exercising eminent domain; in order to exact
the easement as a condition of the building permit, the easement would
need to address some impact that would warrant denial of the permit; and
since the easement served to facilitate public access across the Nollan’s
property and did not address any impact created by the house itself, the
court found no “essential nexus” between the exacted easement and any
public problem created or exacerbated by the new house.55 Thus, it
concluded that the Commission could not exact the easement without
compensation.
The decision in Dolan v. City of Tigard also addressed the
constitutionality of a development condition requiring the dedication of
an easement for public use. Mrs. Dolan operated a hardware store with a
gravel parking lot on 1.6 acres in the central business district of Tigard,
Oregon. A creek traversed the site. Dolan applied for a permit to double
the size of the store, pave a parking lot, and build another commercial
building. The city conditioned the necessary permits on dedication of: (a)
the creek's floodplain for use as a drainage and flood control area, (b) the
creek's floodplain for use as a public recreational area, and (c) a strip of
land for a pedestrian/bicycle pathway. Dolan appealed, claiming that the
city had not identified any “special quantifiable burdens” to justify the
required dedications.
After proceeding through the state court system, the case reached
the United States Supreme Court where the court posed the question:
“What is the required degree of connection between the exactions
imposed by the city and the projected impacts of the proposed
development?”56 To this, it provided the following answer:
We think a term such as “rough proportionality” best encapsulates
what we hold to be the requirement of the Fifth Amendment. No
precise mathematical calculation is required, but the city must make
some sort of individualized determination that the required dedica55. Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 834-37 (1987).
56. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 375 (1994).
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tion is related both in nature and extent to the impact of the proposed development.57

Both Nollan and Dolan began with the premise that the
government’s direct appropriation of the easements would have been a
per se physical taking.58 Accordingly, each case addressed the question
of whether the government could, without paying compensation
otherwise required by the Fifth Amendment, demand the easement as a
condition for granting the development permits. The Nollan court
answered affirmatively, provided that the dedication would substantially
advance the same governmental interest that would furnish a valid
ground for denial of the permit.59 The Dolan court refined this
requirement, holding that an exaction requiring the dedication of private
property must also be roughly proportional “both in nature and extent to
the impact of the proposed development.”60 The Dolan court found the
dedication of an easement for drainage and flood control to satisfy this
requirement, but that the dedications of the public recreation area and the
pedestrian pathway did not.
In the subsequent decision of City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes
at Monterey, Ltd.,61 the Supreme Court initially limited the Nollan and
Dolan tests to exactions of dedications of land. In a case involving
challenges to multiple delays in permitting, the court refused to extend
the Nollan and Dolan tests beyond the exaction of conditions requiring
the dedication of private property for public use.62
Six years after the decision in Del Monte Dunes the court in Lingle
v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc.63 further narrowed the application of the Nollan
and Dolan tests to adjudicative decisions resulting in the imposition of
unconstitutional conditions. As noted above, Lingle reversed 25 years of
takings jurisprudence by discarding the test enunciated in Agins v. City of
Tiburon64 that a regulation may effect a taking if it does not substantially
advance legitimate state interests.65 In addressing the impact of its
holding upon prior takings decisions, the court limited the application of
Nollan and Dolan to the narrow doctrine of “unconstitutional
conditions”:
57. Id. at 391.
58. Id. at 384; Nollan, 438 U.S. at 831-32.
59. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 834-37.
60. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391.
61. City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, 526 U.S. 687, 702-703 (1999).
62. Id. (emphasis added).
63. See Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528 (2005).
64. See Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
65. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 545.
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Although Nollan and Dolan quoted Agins' language, the rule those
decisions established is entirely distinct from the “substantially advances” test we address today. Whereas the “substantially advances” inquiry before us now is unconcerned with the degree or type of
burden a regulation places upon property, Nollan and Dolan both
involved dedications of property so onerous that, outside the exactions context, they would be deemed per se physical takings. In neither case did the Court question whether the exaction would substantially advance some legitimate state interest. Rather, the issue
was whether the exactions substantially advanced the same interests
that land-use authorities asserted would allow them to deny the
permit altogether. As the Court explained in Dolan, these cases involve a special application of the “doctrine of ‘unconstitutional
conditions,’” which provides that “the government may not require
a person to give up a constitutional right -- here the right to receive
just compensation when property is taken for a public use -- in exchange for a discretionary benefit conferred by the government
where the benefit has little or no relationship to the property.66

The Lingle decision narrows the Nollan and Dolan holdings in at
least three respects: (1) it abandons the Agins “substantially advances”
test, and consequently use of the Takings Clause to scrutinize the
interests served by legislation; (2) it recasts those decisions as
applications of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine; and (3) it limits
the heightened scrutiny of the nexus and proportionality tests to the
“adjudicative” imposition of permit conditioning, as opposed to
legislatively-enacted land use regulations of broad applicability.67
B.

Koontz expands the Nollan and Dolan tests to denials of land use
permits and to monetary exactions.

In the 2013 decision of Koontz v. St Johns River Water
Management District, the US Supreme Court reaffirmed application of
the Nollan and Dolan standards to the imposition of unconstitutional
conditions but broadened their application in two respects: 1) to preconditions for permit approvals; and 2) to permit conditions requiring the
66. Id. at 547-48 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted).
67. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 385 (1994) (applying the holding to an
“adjudicative decision” conditioning petitioner’s property, as opposed to “legislative determinations
classifying entire areas of the city”); See also Daniel L. Siegel, Exactions after Lingle: How Basing
Nollan and Dolan on the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine Limits Their Scope, 28 STAN.
ENVTL. L. J. 577, 611 (2009) (“It is the imposition of land-use conditions in individual cases,
authorized by a permit scheme which by its nature allows for both the discretionary deployment of
the police power and an enhanced potential for its abuse, that constitutes the sine qua non for
application of the intermediate standard of scrutiny formulated by the court in Nollan and Dolan.”).
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payment of money, as opposed to the dedication of interests in land as
had occurred in Nollan and Dolan. While Koontz provides answers to
questions left open by Nollan and Dolan, it raises several new issues,
such as the nature of permit denials and types of permit conditions that
could trigger a Koontz challenge and the types of fees and charges that
would be subject to Nollan and Dolan review. But Koontz does not
support expansion of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine as a litmus
test for all manner of land use legislation.
The Koontz appeal arose from a challenge to the ability of the St
Johns River Water Management District to impose permit conditions
requiring the dedication of a conservation easement and the improvement
of off-site lands held by the Water District. The applicant, Coy Koontz,
Sr., who was represented in the appeal by his estate, had applied to
develop 3.7 acres of a 14.9 acre tract consisting mostly of wetlands.68 As
a condition for wetland fill, Koontz offered to dedicate to the Water
District a conservation easement covering eleven acres of the site.69 But
the Water District regarded the proposed mitigation as insufficient and
requested the applicant to agree to either of two additional conditions: a
reduction of the area of impact to one acre together with dedication of a
conservation easement; or improvement of a Water District site several
miles away.70 Although the Water District did not issue a permit decision
that included either of these conditions, Koontz challenged the Water
District’s position as excessively burdening his property.71 Following
appeals, a remand, and further appeals in the Florida state courts, Koontz
ultimately sought and gained Supreme Court review.72
The Supreme Court considered two issues: whether the essential
nexus and rough proportionality standards of Nollan and Dolan applied
to conditions precedent for the issuance of a development permit; and
whether those standards applied to permit conditions requiring the
payment of money, as opposed to just the dedication of possessory
interests as had occurred in Nollan and Dolan.
On the first question, all justices agreed that a demand for property
“must satisfy the requirements of Nollan and Dolan even when the
government denies the permit [.]”73 The Court recognized that the Fifth
Amendment mandates just compensation only for takings, but in cases
68. Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2591-92 186 L. Ed. 2d 697
(2013).
69. Id. at 2592-93.
70. Id. at 2593.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 2593-94.
73. Id. at 2599.
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involving permit denials “nothing has been taken.”74 So rather than
presenting a claim for just compensation under the Fifth Amendment, the
court considered Koontz’s challenge to be an “unconstitutional
conditions claim predicated on the Takings Clause.”75 Having recognized
the inapplicability of just compensation, the court deferred to the Florida
court a determination of available remedies for the imposition of
unconstitutional conditions.76 The Court also declined “to consider how
concrete and specific a demand must be to give rise to liability under
Nollan and Dolan.”77
On the second question, a 5-4 majority ruled that a permit condition
requiring the payment of money must also satisfy the nexus and
proportionality tests.78 The majority began by acknowledging that
“[t]axes and user fees . . . are not takings.”79 The court distinguished the
Water District’s proposed condition requiring the expenditure of funds
from the requirement to provide health benefits to retired miners, which
it determined not to be a taking in Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel.80 The
Court drew this distinction on grounds that the condition in Koontz was
“linked to a specific, identifiable property interest” and concluded the
monetary demand “would amount to a per se taking similar to the taking
of an easement or a lien.”81
Although the Court declined to identify the types of payments to
which its holding would apply,82 it did observe that the decision “does
not affect the ability of governments to impose property taxes, user fees,
and similar laws and regulations that may impose financial burdens on
property owners.”83 The Court’s refusal to more specifically identify the
dividing point between those monetary exactions that would be subject to
the nexus and proportionality tests and those that would not leave much
room for debate.
The dissent, authored by Justice Kagen, and joined by Justices
Ginsburg, Breyer and Sotomayor, agreed with the majority on the first
issue that the Nollan-Dolan standard applies to conditions precedent to

74. Id. at 2597.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.at 2598.
78. Id. at 2603.
79. Id. at 2600-01 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
80. E. Enter. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498 (1998).
81. Koontz, 133 S.Ct. at 2600 (citations to Dolan and Nolan omitted).
82. Id. at 2602.
83. Id. at 2601.

16

Seattle Journal of Environmental Law

[Vol. 4:1

the granting of development permits.84 On the second issue, the dissent
argued that the heightened scrutiny of the Nollan and Dolan decisions
did not apply to the conditioning of development approval upon the
payment or expenditure of money, instead maintaining that challenges to
such exactions as takings should be reviewable under the Penn Central
test.85 The dissent agreed with the majority that the Nollan-Dolan
standard applies only when demands are made during the permitting
process that would otherwise require compensation (the rationale for
each of those holdings), but reasoned that the Water District’s suggested
condition of improvement to off-site property should not be subject to
Nollan-Dolan scrutiny since such a condition would not have amounted
to taking had it been made in the absence of permitting.86 The dissent
concluded that the Water District had never required anything of Koontz
(it had simply suggested conditions to bring the application into
compliance with regulatory standards), that Koontz had never given up
anything, so that nothing had been taken and the prohibition against
unconstitutional conditions should not even apply.87
In sum, following the holding in Koontz the heightened essential
nexus and rough proportionality tests apply to: 1) conditions
adjudicatively imposed through permitting, as opposed to legislativelyenacted regulations of broad applicability; 2) conditions imposed for
permit receipt, as well as those for permit compliance; 3) conditions
requiring the granting of possessory interests in land; and 4) conditions
requiring the expenditure of money that is linked to a specific,
identifiable property interest. However, the heightened scrutiny under
Nollan, Dolan, and Koontz would not apply to property taxes, user fees
and similar requirements imposing financial burdens on property owners.
Regarding remedies, since Nollan, Dolan, and Koontz claims arise
through challenges to permit conditions, relief may lie through the
removal of the challenged conditions, as opposed to the payment of just
compensation.88 The Koontz court leaves to state law the availability of
damages for the imposition of conditions found to be unconstitutional.
The next section examines how the Koontz decision may affect
Washington courts’ application of the holdings in Nollan and Dolan.

84. Id. at 2603.
85. Id. at 2604.
86. Id. at 2605-06.
87. Id. at 2612.
88. Id. at 2600 n.2, 2603 (Justice Kagen concurring).
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Washington Courts’ Expansive Application of Nollan and Dolan

Prior to Koontz, Washington courts departed from federal decisions
by extending the holdings in Nollan and Dolan beyond circumstances
involving dedications of land (the original context of Nollan and Dolan)
to cases challenging the imposition of development fees and the
reasonableness of development regulations. The Koontz decision now
offers Washington courts a fresh opportunity to conform their application
of Nollan and Dolan to federal case law.
Any effort by the state to conform to federal case law must
recognize that the Nollan, Dolan and Koontz decisions emerged from the
application of the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions and not directly
from the Fifth Amendment.89 To date, state court decisions have not
qualified the application of the Nollan and Dolan as a manifestation of
the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, or even applied the doctrine of
unconstitutional conditions outside of the realm of criminal law.90
1. Application of Nollan and Dolan to dedications
Several cases have applied the essential nexus and rough
proportionality tests to conditions requiring the dedication of land. In
Sparks v. Douglas County,91 the court upheld the dedication of additional
right of way under Nollan and Dolan as necessary to accommodate
additional traffic from sixteen new lots created by four adjacent
subdivisions. In Burton v. Clark County,92 the court found that a
condition requiring the dedication of land for the continuation of a public
road through a three-lot subdivision of land failed the rough
proportionality test under Dolan. And in Benchmark Land Co. v. City of
Battle Ground,93 the state Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals’
application of the Nollan and Dolan tests in a challenge to a condition
requiring the dedication of right of way for a street that would not
actually serve the proposed development. The court sidestepped the
constitutional issue by voiding the dedication on procedural grounds, that
it lacked support by substantial evidence.

89. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 547-48 (2005).
90. See e.g., In re Dyer, 175 Wash. 2d 186, 203-04, 283 P.3d 1103 (2012) (rejecting
unconstitutional conditions challenge to parole board recommendation); Butler v. Kato, 137 Wash.
App. 515, 532, 154 P.3d 259 (2007) (finding conditions of pre-trial release to be barred under
doctrine of unconstitutional conditions).
91. Sparks v. Douglas Cnty., 127 Wash. 2d 901, 917, 904 P.2d 738 (1995).
92. Burton v. Clark Cnty., 91 Wash. App. 505, 958 P.2d 343 (1998).
93. Benchmark Land Co. v. City of Battle Ground, 146 Wash. 2d 685, 49 P.3d 860 (2002).
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Although the Washington courts treated each of these cases as
involving takings challenges, as opposed to the attempted exaction of
unconstitutional conditions, their holdings appear to conform to federal
decisions applying the Nollan and Dolan standards to exactions of
possessory interests, including the most recent decision in Koontz.
2. Application of Nollan and Dolan to fees in lieu of dedications
Well before Koontz, Washington courts applied the Nollan and
Dolan standards to development conditions requiring the payment of fees
in lieu of the dedication of land, but they have done so to further buttress
the application of the state’s statutory limitations on development fees
under RCW Chapter 82.02, and not as a separate, federal constitutional
ground for upholding or invalidating the development fees at issue. To
place this distinction into its statutory context, a brief review of RCW
Chapter 82.02 follows.
RCW Chapter 82.02 provides authority for and limitations upon the
ability of local governments to impose taxes and fees on the permitting
and development of land. As this chapter was amended in 1982, RCW
82.02.020 largely prohibited local governments (counties, cities and
towns) from imposing taxes, fees, and other charges upon land
development. The prohibition against taxes on land development
emerged as a compromise under which local governments were given
additional taxing authority.94 The prohibition against taxes, fees, and
charges on development is codified at RCW 82.02.020 and presently
reads in part as follows:
Except as provided in RCW 64.34.440 and 82.02.050 through
82.02.090, no county, city, town, or other municipal corporation
shall impose any tax, fee, or charge, either direct or indirect, on the
construction or reconstruction of residential buildings, commercial
buildings, industrial buildings, or on any other building or building
space or appurtenance thereto, or on the development, subdivision,
classification, or reclassification of land.95

The section goes on to allow three exceptions to the general prohibition
of “any tax, fee, or charge” upon the development of land: 1) dedications
within the development “reasonably necessary as a direct result of the
proposed development”; 2) voluntary payments in lieu of the dedication
of land; and 3) voluntary payments to mitigate direct impacts of the
94. 1982 Wash. Sess. Laws 1547, 1550. See also Martha S. Lester, Subdivision Exactions in
Washington: The Controversy over Imposing Fees on Developers, 59 WASH. L. REV. 289 (1984).
95. WASH. REV. CODE § 82.02.020 (2013) (emphasis added).
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proposed development.96 RCW 82.02.020 was enacted in response to a
challenge to impact fees in the then pending case of Hillis Homes v.
Snohomish Cnty.97
Amendments to Chapter 82.02 adopted in 1990 as part of the
Growth Management Act (GMA, or “the Act”)98 authorized those
96. RCW 82.02.020 provides in relevant part:
Except only as expressly provided in chapters 67.28 and 82.14 RCW, the state
preempts the field of imposing taxes upon retail sales of tangible personal property, the
use of tangible personal property, parimutuel wagering authorized pursuant to RCW
67.16.060, conveyances, and cigarettes, and no county, town, or other municipal
subdivision shall have the right to impose taxes of that nature. Except as provided in
RCW 82.02.050 through 82.02.090, no county, city, town, or other municipal corporation
shall impose any tax, fee, or charge, either direct or indirect, on the construction or
reconstruction of residential buildings, commercial buildings, industrial buildings, or on
any other building or building space or appurtenance thereto, or on the development,
subdivision, classification, or reclassification of land. However, this section does not
preclude dedications of land or easements within the proposed development or plat which
the county, city, town, or other municipal corporation can demonstrate are reasonably
necessary as a direct result of the proposed development or plat to which the dedication
of land or easement is to apply.
This section does not prohibit voluntary agreements with counties, cities, towns, or
other municipal corporations that allow a payment in lieu of a dedication of land or to
mitigate a direct impact that has been identified as a consequence of a proposed
development, subdivision, or plat. A local government shall not use such voluntary
agreements for local off-site transportation improvements within the geographic
boundaries of the area or areas covered by an adopted transportation program authorized
by chapter 39.92 RCW. Any such voluntary agreement is subject to the following
provisions:
(1) The payment shall be held in a reserve account and may only be expended to fund a
capital improvement agreed upon by the parties to mitigate the identified, direct impact;
(2) The payment shall be expended in all cases within five years of collection; and
(3) Any payment not so expended shall be refunded with interest at the rate applied to
judgments to the property owners of record at the time of the refund; however, if the
payment is not expended within five years due to delay attributable to the developer, the
payment shall be refunded without interest.
No county, city, town, or other municipal corporation shall require any payment as
part of such a voluntary agreement which the county, city, town, or other municipal
corporation cannot establish is reasonably necessary as a direct result of the proposed
development or plat. WASH. REV. CODE §82.02.020 (2013).
97. Hillis Homes, Inc. v. Snohomish Cnty., 97 Wash. 2d 804, 811, 650 P. 2d 193 (1982); See
Donya Williamson, Note, Urbanites versus Rural Rights; Contest of Local Government Land-Use
Regulations under Washington Preemption Statute 82.02.020, 84 WASH. L. REV. 491, 502 (2009).
98. The Growth Management Act, principally codified at WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A,
establishes mandatory planning requirements for counties and cities that are either required to plan
on account of their populations or growth rates or have voluntarily opted to plan under the Act.
WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.040(1) - (2). For a review of the genesis and requirements of the Act,
see Settle & Gavigan, The Growth Management Revolution in Washington: Past, Present, and
Future, 16 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 867 (1993).
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counties and cities planning under the Act to impose impact fees to fund
system improvements reasonably related to proposed land use
developments.99 Implementing such authority requires a county or city to
adopt separate impact fee legislation. Impact fees then result from the
application of objective fee schedules and are not simply determined on
an ad hoc basis.100
As applied through Chapter 82.02, Washington courts have
determined the Nollan and Dolan standards to be applicable to the
limitations on local tax authority under RCW 82.02.020, but not to
impact fees authorized under RCW 82.02.050-.090.101 In Trimen Dev.
Co. v. King Cnty,102 the court upheld the imposition of park fees under
RCW 82.02.020 based upon an adopted formula that calculated
requirements for the dedication of additional park area on a per lot basis
and allowed the payment of fees in lieu of the actual dedication of land.
In concluding that the park fees met the standard under RCW 82.02.020
of being “reasonably necessary as a direct result of the proposed
development or plat[,]” the court cited the “rough proportionality”
language under Dolan.103
In City of Olympia v. Drebick,104 the court rejected a challenge to
impact fees enacted under RCW 82.02.050 -.090. The court’s analysis
concluded that the heightened scrutiny of Nollan/Dolan was inapplicable
on grounds it did not apply to “general growth impact fees imposed
pursuant to statutorily authorized ordinances.”105 Consistent with this
holding, the Court of Appeals in City of Federal Way v. Town & Country
Real Estate, LLC,106 regarded Nollan and Dolan as applicable only to
“fees in lieu of possessory exactions,” but not to GMA impact fees under
RCW 82.02.050 -.090.
Even though the legislature in 1982 plainly could not have enacted
RCW Chapter 82.02 in response to Nollan or Dolan (decided in 1987
and 1994, respectively), the exaction of “voluntary” impact fees
99. 1990 Wash. Sess. Laws 42-44, 46-48.
100. See WASH. REV. CODE §§ 82.02.050 (4), 060(1) (2013).
101. Although codified under statutes authorizing excise taxes, the provisions set forth at
WASH. REV. CODE §82.02.050-.090 were enacted by the same session law adopting the Growth
Management Act. These provisions grant to those counties and cities planning under the Act the
authority to adopt and to implement ordinances requiring the payment of fee to off-set the impacts of
development.
102. Trimen Dev. Co. v. King Cnty., 124 Wash. 2d 261, 274, 877 P.2d 187 (1994).
103. Id. at 274.
104. City of Olympia v. Drebick, 156 Wash. 2d 289, 301–03, 126 P.3d 802 (2006).
105. Id. at 302.
106. City of Federal Way v. Town & Country Real Estate, LLC, 161 Wash. App. 17, 45, 252
P.3d 382 (2011).
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consistent with the standards of RCW 82.02.020 would likely survive a
Koontz challenge since such exactions would need to satisfy the statutory
requirement that they be “reasonably necessary as a direct result of the
proposed development.”
The imposition of GMA impact fees presents a closer question.
Under the limited guidance in Koontz, there are at least two reasons why
“general growth impact fees imposed pursuant to statutorily authorized
ordinances,” as termed by Drebick, should not be subject to heightened
review under Nollan, Dolan, and Koontz. First, the imposition and
magnitude of such fees are determined not on an ad hoc basis through
permit conditioning, but rather through legislatively-enacted fee
schedules, to which the unconstitutional conditions doctrine would not
apply.107 And second, such general growth impact fees are either
specifically authorized as an exercise of local taxing authority under
RCW 82.02.050 et seq., or alternatively, they are exempt from Koontz
because they result from the application of “similar laws and regulations
that may impose financial burdens on property owners.”108
Even still, whether GMA impacts fees and other restrictions on land
development that are based upon legislatively-adopted regulations, but
imposed through permitting escape review under Nollan, Dolan, and
Koontz is likely to be debated. The review of land use applications
frequently involves the imposition through permitting of legislatively
proscribed impact fees, environmental mitigations, development
conditions, and other restrictions.109 Although impact fee schedules and
other mitigation measures are set forth in legislation, the magnitude of
impact fees and the extent of mitigations typically are established
through permitting. The imposition of such mitigations may be claimed
to be an exercise of adjudicative conditioning and therefore subject to
scrutiny under Nollan, Dolan, and Koontz. An analysis more consistent
with those holdings would treat the imposition of legislatively-based
mitigations as exempt from heightened scrutiny since such conditions

107. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 385 (1994) (applying the holding to the
“adjudicative” conditions, as opposed to “legislative determinations” applicable to entire areas of a
jurisdiction).
108. Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S.Ct. 2586, 2601, 186 L. Ed. 2d 697
(2013).
109. For example, the King County Code at section 21A.24.325 contains standardized
requirements for wetland buffers, available at http://your.kingcounty.gov/mkcc/clerk/code/2430_Title_21A.pdf. For the calculation of traffic mitigation fees for single and multi-family
development, the King County code at section 14.75.040 provides a table of fees which varies by
geographical region of the county, available at http://your.kingcounty.gov/mkcc/clerk/code/
17_Title_14.pdf .
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result from regulations enacted through the checks and balances of the
legislative process and not imposed through the unbridled discretion of
permit reviewers.110
3. Application of Nollan and Dolan to non-possessory set asides
Washington courts have also applied the Nollan-Dolan standards to
land use conditions requiring the set aside of lands for open space, even
in the absence of a formal dedication to the public or to public use. In
Isla Verde v. City of Camas,111 the Court of Appeals found to be a taking
under Nollan-Dolan a requirement that a subdivision set aside 30% of its
site as open space, even though no public dedication was required. The
state Supreme Court rejected the Court of Appeals’ extension of Nollan
and Dolan by finding the open space requirement invalid on statutory,
not constitutional, grounds as a violation of RCW 82.02.020.112
Even though the Supreme Court observed that the Court of Appeals
“should not have reached the constitutional issue,”113 the Court of
Appeals’ invalidation of the open space requirement under the nexus and
proportionality tests would exceed the reach of those tests since the open
space condition was imposed through application of legislativelyadopted standards and not devised through permit conditioning.
Moreover, the open space requirement did not exact a possessory interest
in land, as in Nollan and Dolan, and it did not require the payment or
expenditure of funds to improve land in lieu of a dedication, as in
Koontz.
The test for the exaction of unconstitutional conditions in Isla Verde
would be whether the imposition of a requirement for 30% of a
development to be set aside as open space would amount to a taking in
the absence a permitting condition. Under established case law, a
requirement that 30% of a site be retained in open space would not differ
in principle from other restrictions limiting the extent of land
development that have been upheld under the Penn Central test.114
110. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 385; Daniel L. Siegel, supra note 67.
111. Isla Verde Int’l Holdings, Inc. v. City of Camas, 99 Wash. App. 127, 130-31, 990 P. 2d
429 (1999).
112. Isla Verde Int’l Holdings v. City of Camas, 146 Wash.2d 740, 49 P.3d 867 (2002).
113. Id. at 752.
114. See, e.g., Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 616 (2001) (finding 94 percent
diminution in value insufficient to support a takings claim from rejection of a residential subdivision
on 11 of a 20 acre site that contained 18 acres of wetlands); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New
York, 438 U.S. 104, 131 (1978) (noting that diminution in values of 75 percent in Euclid v. Ambler
Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) and 87.5 percent Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915) did
not amount to takings).
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4. Application of Nollan and Dolan to critical areas and shoreline
regulations
Our state courts’ application of Nollan and Dolan to legislatively
adopted limitations on development in GMA environmentally critical
areas (wetlands, riparian corridors, frequently flooded areas, geologically
hazardous areas and aquifer recharge areas)115 and shorelines lacks
support under Nollan and Dolan, even as amplified by Koontz.
In Honesty in Envtl. Analysis & Legislation v. Central Puget Sound
Growth Hearings Bd. (“HEAL”),116 the Court of Appeals addressed
Nollan and Dolan in a challenge to an ordinance enacted under the GMA
to protect environmentally sensitive areas. In a passage acknowledged to
be dicta, the court opined that the lack of support of development
regulations by best available science could subject permit decisions
based upon those regulations to scrutiny under the Nollan and Dolan
tests:
The briefs of the parties omit any discussion of an important constitutional limitation on local government's discretion in adopting policies and regulations under GMA. Those policies and regulations
are implemented only when they are applied to applications for
permits. And under the State Environmental Policy Act, RCW
43.21C, a local government may impose development conditions
and deny applications only if it first adopts policies and implementing regulations like those at issue here, as a basis for exercising that
authority. RCW 43.21C.060. Therefore, the policies and regulations
adopted under GMA must comply with the nexus and rough proportionality limits the United States Supreme Court has placed on governmental authority to impose conditions on development applications. If a local government fails to incorporate, or otherwise ignores the best available science, its policies and regulations may
well serve as the basis for conditions and denials that are constitutionally prohibited.117

As happens with dicta, the language from HEAL has taken on a life
of its own and received application in subsequent cases. In Kitsap
Alliance of Prop. Owners v. Central Puget Sound Growth Mgmt.
Hearings Bd. (“KAPO”),118 the court cited to HEAL as establishing the
115. WASH. REV. CODE §36.70A.030 (5) (2013). (Definition of GMA defined environmentally
critical areas).
116. Honesty in Environmental Analysis and Legislation (“HEAL”) v. Cent. Puget Sound
Growth Management Hearings Bd., 96 Wash. App. 522, 533-535 (1999).
117. Id. at 533.
118. Kitsap Alliance of Prop. Owners v. Cent. Puget Sound Growth Mgmt. Hearings Bd.,160
Wash. App. 250, 273, 255 P.3d 696 (2011) review denied, 171 Wash. 2d 1030 (2011).
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proposition that GMA regulations must comply with the nexus and rough
proportionality tests, even though the court ultimately found those
standards to be met.
KAPO petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court on asserted grounds that
shoreline buffers and setbacks amounted to the dedication of private
lands for public use, but the Court declined review.119 Regardless of the
reason for the court’s denial, application of the Nollan/Dolan standards
to legislatively-imposed shoreline setbacks not involving either the
dedication of land to public use or the payment of in lieu fees would
clearly exceed the application of those standards under federal case law.
Under the legislative/adjudicative distinction, limitations placed
upon the development of shorelines and other environmentally sensitive
areas would not be subject to heighted scrutiny under Nollan, Dolan, and
Koontz because they are imposed through regulations that are subject to
the checks of the legislative process and not through conditions devised
on an ad hoc basis by permit reviewers.120
5. Application of Nollan, Dolan, and Koontz to financial burdens imposed by taxes, user fees, and similar laws and regulations.
While the Koontz majority recognizes that “taxes and user fees . . .
are not takings,”121 it refuses to identify the line between those fees that
would be subject to review under Nollan and Dolan and those that would
not.122 Apart from impact fees imposed under RCW 82.02.020 and
82.02.050 as discussed above, local governments frequently impose
other financial obligations upon new developments, such as through
utility connection charges, requirements to upgrade storm water controls,
fees to improve transportation systems, and mitigations under the State
Environmental Policy Act (SEPA).
The generality of the Court’s assurance that the decision “does not
affect the ability of governments to impose property taxes, user fees, and
similar laws and regulations that may impose financial burdens on
119. Kitsap Alliance of Prop. Owners v. Cent. Puget Sound Growth Mgmt. Hearings Bd., 132
S. Ct. 1792 (2012).
120. Daniel L. Siegel, supra note 67, at 611-12 (observing that the deployment of discretionary
authority in permit conditioning prompts the heighted scrutiny under Nollan and Dolan and that the
legislative process offers protections for landowners from regulations of general applicability. But
see Winfield B. Martin, Order for the Courts: Reforming the Nollan/Dolan Threshold Inquiry for
Exactions, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1499, 1517-18 (2012) (arguing for a balancing test under which
the heightened scrutiny of Nollan and Dolan would also apply to legislatively-enacted regulations).
121. Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S.Ct. 2586, 2600, 186 L. Ed. 2d 697
(2013).
122. Id. at 2602.
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property owners[,]”123 provides little guidance as to the types of fees and
financial burdens subject to review under the unconstitutional conditions
doctrine. However, pre-Koontz decisions in Washington at least offer
some standards for distinguishing between taxes and regulatory fees, an
important distinction since Koontz apparently grants greater latitude for
taxes. Those decisions also offer some assurance that regulatory fees
would either avoid review or at least survive scrutiny under the Nollan
and Dolan standards.
In distinguishing between taxes and regulatory fees the court in
Covell v. City of Seattle applied three factors: (1) whether the primary
purpose is to raise revenue or to regulate; (2) whether the money
collected must be allocated only to the authorized regulatory purpose;
and (3) whether there is a direct relationship between the fee charged and
the service received by those who pay the fee or between the fee charged
and the burden produced by the fee payer.124 To be characterized as a
regulatory fee, and avoid the constitutional limitations applicable to the
taxation of land, the primary purpose of the charge must be regulatory, as
opposed to revenue raising, the funds must be allocated to the regulatory
purpose, and the fee charged must be related to the benefits or burdens
provided to or produced by the fee payers.125
Under the general distinction as to whether the purpose of the fee is
to raise revenue or to regulate land use, courts have determined a street
utility charge to be a tax,126 but a storm water charge,127 a water service
connection charge,128 and a fire district benefit charge129 to be regulatory
fees. Without determining them to be taxes, the courts have characterized
school130 and transportation impact fees131 as revenue raising devices and
123. Id. at 2601.
124. Covell v. City of Seattle, 127 Wash.2d 874, 879, 905 P.2d 324 (1995).
125. Frach v. Schoettler, 46 Wash.2d 281, 289, 280 P.2d 1038 (1955) (stating that
“[r]egulatory fees paid are not subject to the constitutional restrictions on the power to tax.”); Samis
Land Co. v. City of Soap Lake, 143 Wash.2d 798, 805 nn.12-14, 23 P.3d 477 (2001) (those
constitution limitations include the requirements under the Washington Constitution Article VII,
section 1 that all taxes be uniform upon the same class of property, and under Article VII, section 2
that in any year the value of all taxes levied not exceed one percent of the true and fair value of the
property taxed).
126. Covell, 127 Wash.2d at 884-85.
127. Teter v. Clark Cnty., 104 Wash.2d 227, 704 P.2d 1171 (1985).
128. Hillis Homes, Inc. v. Pub. Util. Dist. 1, 105 Wash.2d 288, 300, 714 P.2d 1163 (1986).
129. King Cnty. Fire Protection Dist. 16 v. Housing Auth., 123 Wash.2d 819, 872 P.2d 516
(1994).
130. Wellington River Hollow, LLC v. King Cnty, 121 Wash. App. 224, 240, 54 P.3d 213
(2002).
131. New Castle Investments v. City of LaCenter, 98 Wash. App. 224, 233-238, 989 P.2d 569
(1999) review denied, 140 Wash.2d 1019, 5 P.3d 9 (2000).
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not regulatory fees. If characterized as taxes, charges and other fees
could at least fall within the Koontz’s generalization that they are not
takings.
Even still, the characterization of charges as regulatory fees rather
than taxes would not automatically subject the charges to the heightened
review under Nollan and Dolan. To be subject to the nexus and
proportionality requirements, the fee obligations would need to be
imposed through permit conditioning under circumstances in which the
obligations would otherwise constitute a per se taking.132 Many charges
that may be loosely characterized as “regulatory fees” are imposed to
recover the costs to local governments of furnishing goods or services
which directly benefit the ownership and use of property, such as “utility
customer fees, utility connection fees, garbage collection fees, local
storm water facility fees, user fees, permit fees, parking fees, registration
fees, filing fees, and license fees.”133 Other regulatory fees are imposed
to offset negative externalities of the use of land, such as fees imposed to
address surface water runoff, on-site septic sewage, water quality, and
aquifer protection.134
While such regulatory fees could be challenged on grounds that
they amount to monetary exactions subject to scrutiny under the
heightened standards of Nollan, Dolan, and Koontz, Washington courts
have sustained each of those types of regulatory fees under standards
similar to the essential nexus and rough proportionality tests. To be
upheld, regulatory fees must demonstrate a “direct relationship between
the fee charged and the service received . . . or between the fee charged
and the burden produced by the fee payer.”135 While the “direct
relationship” test of Covell “has not demanded mathematical precision,”
it sufficiently approximates the essential nexus and rough proportionality
tests to allow regulatory fees sustained under Covell to also survive a
constitutional conditions challenge under Nollan and Dolan.
The same may be said for impact fees imposed through permit
conditioning. SEPA authorizes governmental agencies to condition
132. Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S.Ct. 2586, 2600, 186 L. Ed. 2d 697
(2013) (“[W]hen the government commands the relinquishment of funds linked to a specific,
identifiable property interest, such as a bank account or parcel of real property, a per se takings
approach is the proper mode of analysis under the Court’s precedent.”) (internal quotations and
citations omitted).
133. Samis Land Co. v. City of Soap Lake, 143 Wash.2d 798, 805, 23 P.3d 477 (2001).
134. Id. at 811-13. The distinction between fees for governmental benefits and charges to
address negative externalities is more fully explored in Hugh Spitzer, Taxes vs. Fees: A Curious
Confusion, 38 GONZ. L. REV 335, 343-50 (2003).
135. Covell v. City of Seattle, 127 Wash.2d 874, 879, 905 P.2d 324 (1995).
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governmental action upon the mitigation of a proposal’s impacts.136 In
the review of land use and environmental permit applications,
mitigations under SEPA are typically applied on an ad hoc basis and
therefore could be subject to an unconstitutional conditions challenge.
However, if properly exercised, mitigations under SEPA must be based
upon adopted policies and tailored to mitigate identified impacts of a
proposal137 and therefore should be able to survive scrutiny under Nollan,
Dolan, and Koontz.
Transportation impact fees imposed under Chapter 39.92 would
likely survive an unconstitutional conditions challenge as well. Chapter
39.92 authorizes local governments to designate geographical areas to be
benefited by certain transportation improvements and to impose fees on
new development to fund those improvements.138 Since the amount of
any particular impact fee would be determined by a formula adopted
through legislation,139 and not calculated on a permit-by-permit basis, the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine arguably would not apply. But if it
did, transportation impact fees imposed under Chapter 39.92 would
likely survive such heightened scrutiny since the impact fees may not
exceed the amount that the local government would have determined to
be “reasonably necessary as a direct result of the proposed
development,”140 a standard arguably parallel to nexus and
proportionality.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Washington case law presently offers practitioners wide latitude in
arguing for relief under the Fifth Amendment. Our court’s framework for
analyzing Fifth Amendment claims has produced a body of case law that
is difficult to apply, lacks predictability and conflicts with the very
federal doctrine it purports to apply. Landowners, citizens, local
governments and the courts would be better served by clearer, more
consistent application of these authorities. For Fifth Amendment takings
claims, more predictable standards would result from the state court’s
adoption of the federal takings test, or at least through an articulation as
136. WASH. REV. CODE §43.21C.060 (2013).
137. Id. (“Such action may be conditioned only to mitigate specific adverse environmental
impacts which are identified in the environmental documents prepared under this chapter.”); WASH.
ADMIN. CODE § 197-11-660(1)(d) (1995) (“Responsibility for implementing mitigation measures
may be imposed upon an applicant only to the extent attributable to the identified adverse impacts of
its proposal.”)
138. WASH. REV. CODE §39.92.030 (2013).
139. WASH. REV. CODE §39.92.040 (2013).
140. WASH. REV. CODE §39.92.030(4) (2013).
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to how the state’s own taking analysis is supported by either a Gunwall
analysis or by independent application through Article I, Section 16 of
the state constitution. As well, our state courts’ application of the Nollan
and Dolan standards would better conform to federal case law if limited
to the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions and not expanded to serve
as a test for land use legislation in general. And finally, while its full
reach remains to be determined, the holding in Koontz would not appear
to further limit the exaction of impact fees beyond what our courts have
already allowed on statutory grounds.
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APPENDIX B: REGULATORY TAKINGS – WASHINGTON’S ANALYSIS
Categorical, per se takings – Washington’s First Threshold Inquiry

